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INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Nature of Proceedings, Statement 
of Issues on Appeal and Statement of Facts are adequately covered 
in Appellant's opening brief. This brief is submitted in reply to 
Respondent's brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the time that the Defendant entered his guilty plea, the 
law in Utah required strict compliance with Rule 11(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the Appellant executed an 
Affidavit when he pleaded guilty which recited that a guilty plea 
necessarily waived an accused's rights to confrontation, to cross-
examine the witnesses against him, to a jury trial, and to an 
appeal, the burden for ensuring Rule 11(e) compliance was squarely 
on the judge, and an Affidavit was not a sufficient substitute for 
Rule 11(e) compliance on the record at the time that the guilty 
plea was entered. The failure of the trial court to fulfill the 
requirements of Rule 11(e)(3) on the record at the time the 
Defendant entered his plea mandates setting aside the Appellant's 
guilty plea and conviction. 
On the morning that the Appellant's case was scheduled to go 
to trial, a respected and experienced defense lawyer appeared in 
court at the request of the County Attorney to assist the Appel-
lant. Although defense counsel should be commended for his 
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willingness to volunteer his services on short notice, he was, 
under the circumstances, incapable of rendering effective assis-
tance to the Appellant. Counsel could not intelligently assess the 
propriety of the denial of the Motion to Suppress without reviewing 
the police reports and a transcript of the testimony at the 
suppression hearing. By pleading guilty, the Appellant waived his 
right to challenge the trial judge's denial of this Motion to 
Suppress. However, the stop of the Appellant's motor vehicle was 
not supported by an articulable suspicion; and as a result, the 
order denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress was erroneous. 
Competent and effective counsel would not have presumed to advise 
an accused to plead guilty without a more thorough understanding 
of the search issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(REPLY TO POINT I IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF) 
THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 
RULE 11(E) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND 
STATE V. GIBBONS 
The State's opening argument is that because the Defendant did 
not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea before the trial 
court, this appeal should be dismissed. Although it is true that 
no motion to withdraw the plea was filed in the trial court, the 
facts in the instant matter are essentially identical to the facts 
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in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). On appeal, Gibbons 
claimed his guilty plea was entered in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-11 (1982 and Supp. 1986). Because of unusual circumstances 
which included the changing of defense counsel during the pendency 
of the appeal, no motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed in 
the trial court. Although it is true that the Gibbons Court did 
note that an issue first raised on appeal will not ordinarily be 
entertained absent exceptional circumstances, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the change of defense counsel was an exceptional 
circumstance. Moreover, the Supreme Court also noted that a motion 
to withdraw the guilty plea, if successful, would render the appeal 
of the guilty plea moot. However, if the motion were unsuccessful, 
an appeal would then be taken, and two appeals would then result 
in the same case. From a purely practical perspective, the Supreme 
Court in Gibbons remanded the case to enable the defendant to file 
a motion to withdraw the guilty plea with the trial court. The 
Supreme Court also retained jurisdiction over the case for any 
necessary future action after the lower court proceedings. This 
approach avoided the possibility of two separate appeals arising 
from two different judgments in the same criminal case. 
The facts in the instant matter parallel the Gibbons facts. 
Here the Defendant represented himself up until the day of trial. 
He was then assisted by James Barber for the limited purposes of 
3 
entering the plea and handling the sentencing. Mr. Barber appeared 
in Court to assist the Defendant as a personal favor to David 
Yocom, the Salt Lake County Attorney, and Mr. Barber's former law 
associate. Following the entry of the plea and sentencing, the 
Defendant filed a Pro Se Notice of Appeal. Defense counsel was not 
appointed to assist the Defendant in pursuing his appeal until the 
6th day of June, 1989. Thus, just as in Gibbons, the appeal 
process had been commenced and the Defendant found himself in the 
same procedural limbo as did the defendant in Gibbons. Under these 
circumstances, this Court should entertain the appeal and render 
a decision which will assist the trial court in deciding the motion 
to withdraw. Furthermore, retention of jurisdiction by this Court 
will preserve Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel issue 
if it is not rendered moot by the motion to withdraw the plea. See 
Gibbons, Footnote 2, 740 P.2d at 1311-1312. 
In its brief, the State has admitted that the trial judge did 
not specifically articulate the nature of the constitutional rights 
that the Defendant waived by entering his guilty plea. Specifical-
ly, the State concedes that the trial judge failed to inquire of 
the Defendant whether he understood by pleading guilty that he 
waived his rights against self-incrimination, to confrontation, and 
to a jury trial. However, the State contends that notwithstanding 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1308 (Utah 1987), State v. 
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Vasilacopulos, 756 P. 2d 92 (Utah App. 1988), and State v. Valencia, 
776 P. 2d 1332 (Utah App. 1989), that substantial, and not strict 
compliance is all that is required under Rule 11(e)(3). In support 
of this proposition, the State asserts on page 7 of its brief that 
the aforementioned cases are "inconsistent with recent Utah Supreme 
Court rulings and should not be followed". The State's contention 
is erroneous. 
In support of its position, the State relies upon Jolivet v. 
Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Aug. 22, 1989), State v. 
Cope land, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), and State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 
1294 (Utah 1986). Significantly, all three of these cases involved 
guilty pleas entered prior to State v. Gibbons, supra. This is a 
rather significant distinction. Thus, although it is true that all 
three of these cases discuss the substantial compliance or record 
as a whole test, they are pre-Gibbons cases. State v. Gibbons, 
supra, was not given retroactive application. That was so because 
a new rule of criminal procedure constituting a clear break with 
the past will not be applied retroactively. Rather, in those 
circumstances where a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his 
guilty plea under Rule 11 after State v. Gibbons was decided, but 
when the guilty plea was actually entered prior to the pronounce-
ment of State v. Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the record 
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as a whole test. See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) 
and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985). 
The facts in Jolivet v. Cook, supra, are interesting and 
worthy of mention in light of the State's reliance upon it. 
Jolivet claimed that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily 
entered. Specifically, Jolivet argued that Judge Burns erred in 
the taking of his guilty pleas because he did not make findings 
that Jolivet understood the elements of each crime charged and how 
those elements related to the facts. At an evidentiary hearing to 
withdraw the guilty pleas, Judge Brian concluded that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged and how those 
elements related to the facts. Justice Zimmerman, writing for the 
Court, concluded that the record facts amply supported the conclu-
sion that Jolivet entered the pleas knowing and understanding full 
well the elements of each of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty: 
Jolivet is of "above average intelligence'1. 
He attended the preliminary hearing at which 
the victim testified in detail about the 
alleged crimes. The victim's factual state-
ments made out all the elements of each crime 
charged. Thereafter, in open court, the judge 
stated that he found probable cause and listed 
the crimes charged and the alleged facts 
relating to those charges. At Jolivetfs first 
arraignment proceeding, after the charges were 
read, his counsel stated that Jolivet had 
requested that the reading of the Amended 
Information be waived, that he had received a 
preliminary hearing on the matter, that 
Jolivet reads, writes, and understands the 
English language, and that Jolivet had read 
6 
the Amended Information and knew its contents* 
Then Jolivet, personally responded to the 
judge's questions, stated that he had com-
pleted two years of college, that he had read 
and understood the language in the Amended 
Information, and that he wanted to waive its 
reading. The Amended Information lists the 
crimes charged, and the facts, in element 
form, that make out each element and, lastly, 
gives the statutory citation for each crime. 
At the beginning of his second arraignment, 
both Jolivet and his counsel stated that they 
were familiar with and fully aware of all of 
the charges. They requested that the charges 
not be read or listed again. Nevertheless, 
the judge read the charges and the facts 
relating to those charges stated. The judge 
then asked Jolivet if the factual situations 
relating to the crimes charged were fairly and 
fully stated. Jolivet answered in the affir-
mative . 
Based upon the foregoing facts, it is not difficult to 
understand why the Supreme Court concluded that Jolivet understood 
the elements of each crime charged and how those elements related 
to the facts. His contention to the contrary was frivolous. 
Similarly, in State v. Copeland, supra, the defendant also 
challenged the voluntariness of his guilty plea. The gist of his 
argument was that the trial court had failed to adequately explain 
the nature and elements of the offense. At the defendant's 
arraignment, the trial judge explained that the charge was "a first 
degree felony of Sodomy on a Child ... alleging that this occurred 
in Cache County on May 1, 1985, by engaging in a sexual act upon 
a child under the age of fourteen and involving the genitals of the 
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actor and the mouth of the child." The Supreme Court noted that 
this explanation not only stated the elements of the crime, but 
also described the specific act of the defendant and his niece, as 
set forth by the defendant in a taped confession available to the 
trial judge at the plea hearing. In dismissing the defendant's 
claim, the Supreme Court stated, "We hold that this record demon-
strates that defendant admitted acts sufficient to justify his 
conviction of the offense to which he pleaded guilty." Id. at 
1273. 
Jolivet, Copeland, and Kay are all pre-Gibbons pronouncements 
from the Utah Supreme Court. None of these cases are inconsistent 
with the rule announced in State v Gibbons: 
"Because of the importance of compliance with 
Rule 11(e) in Boykin, the law places the 
burden of establishing compliance with those 
requirements on the trial judge. ... The use 
of a sufficient affidavit can promote effi-
ciency, but an affidavit should be only the 
starting point, not an end point, in the 
pleading process. ... The trial judge should 
then review the statements in the affidavit 
with the defendant, question the defendant 
concerning his understanding of it, and ful-
fill the other requirements imposed by 
§77-35-11 on the record before accepting the 
guilty plea. Id. 1313. [Emphasis supplied]. 
The State's closing salvo involves a creative interpretation 
of State v. Thurston, 120 Utah Add. Rep. 30 (Utah App. 1989). The 
State interprets this case to mean that this Court has abandoned 
the strict compliance rule articulated in Vasilacopulos and 
8 
Valencia. However, this Court did not make such a statement in 
State v. Thurston. The State may wish to interpret State v. 
Thurston in such a fashion. But there is no clear pronouncement 
in Thurston that Vasilacopulos and Valencia have been overruled. 
Moreover, the facts in State v. Thurston involve a unique Rule 
11 situation. Thurston really involved the interpretation of the 
principle that a defendant is entitled to specific performance of 
a plea negotiation, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
Thurston pled guilty to two counts of Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges 
against the defendant and to recommend probation rather than 
incarceration. The State, by and through its deputy county 
attorney, fulfilled all of the terms of the plea negotiation. That 
is to say, the State did dismiss the additional charges and did 
affirmatively recommend probation rather than incarceration. 
However, the unique problem which arose in Thurston was that 
notwithstanding the deputy county attorney's affirmative recommen-
dation for probation, the pre-sentence report included the opinion 
of the investigating officer "that fifteen years was not a long 
enough term of incarceration for the defendant." This Court con-
cluded that an investigating police officer is not bound by a 
prosecutor's plea bargain to recommend probation. Accordingly, 
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this Court also decided that the defendant's plea bargain agreement 
had not been breached. 
The defendant also argued that his guilty plea was involuntary 
and should be stricken because he entered the plea in reliance upon 
the State's recommendation for probation and that his reliance was 
misplaced because of the investigating police officer's contrary 
sentencing recommendation. In considering that contention, this 
Court reviewed the record and determined that the defendant had 
been fully informed of his rights and the consequences of the 
guilty plea: 
The judge pursuant to Rule 11, informed defen-
dant of his rights to trial and against self-
incrimination and related to him the potential 
consequences of his guilty plea. He obtained 
assurances from both counsel and defendant 
that there was justification for the entry of 
the guilty plea. Specifically, the judge's 
dialogue with defendant indicates that defen-
dant could not have reasonably held an "exag-
gerated belief in the benefits of his plea." 
The judge made it very clear that he was not 
bound by the prosecutor's recommendation of 
probation and could, despite the prosecutor's 
recommendation and reliance upon the pre-
sentence report, impose upon defendant the 
maximum penalty prescribed by law, one to 
fifteen years imprisonment and a fine of up to 
$10,000.00. Defendant indicated that he 
understood, and elected not to change his plea 
in the face of this understanding. Id. at 33. 
In dismissing the defendant's contention that he should be per-
mitted to withdraw his plea, this Court noted that where the 
defendant was aware that there was no guarantee that the trial 
10 
court would follow the prosecutor's recommendation, there was no 
basis to set aside the guilty plea when the trial court did not 
follow the prosecutor's recommendation: 
Defendant's mere subjective belief as to a 
potential sentence is insufficient to invali-
date a guilty plea as involuntary or unknow-
ing. Id. at 33. 
The facts in Thurston are unique and completely different from 
the Rule 11 violation in this instant matter. Regardless of what 
standard was articulated by this Court in Thurston, whether it was 
a record as a whole or strict compliance, there simply was no Rule 
11 violation. Thurston does not overrule Gibbons, Vasilacopulos, 
or Valencia. The Utah Supreme Court has not overruled Gibbons. 
Accordingly, it is the law in this State. Because there were Rule 
11 violations in the instant matter and because the guilty plea was 
entered after the Supreme Court announced State v Gibbons, his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea can only be denied if Gibbons, 
Vasilacopulos and Valencia are overruled and replaced with a record 
as a whole standard. 
POINT II 
(REPLY TO POINT II IN RESPONDENTS BRIEF) 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant agrees with the State's assertion that in order to 
establish prejudice, the Defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
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errors, the result of the proceeding below would have been differ-
ent. However, the Defendant disagrees with the State's contention 
that Barbara Harris's statement established an articulable suspi-
cion that the individuals in the gold car were accomplices. The 
State reads a lot into the statement in order to derive the meaning 
that the people in the gold car were involved in the crime. 
Before reaching any conclusions in this regard, it is impor-
tant to analyze precisely what she was asked and what she specifi-
cally stated. The security guard at Harmon's asked her if anybody 
was with her. He did not ask her whether she had any accomplices 
or associates in the commission of the forgery offense. Her 
response to this inquiry was, "that there was a gold car out in the 
parking lot with the other people that were with her." (8/16/88 
T.6). The Defendant submits that this statement is open to a number 
of interpretations. The State's interpretation stretches the plain 
meaning of her words. In the context of the exact question, Ms. 
Harris's statement could more easily be read to simply mean that 
she was not alone and that she came with some other people who were 
out in the car. None of her words imply that the people in the car 
had any knowledge that she intended to commit a crime when she 
entered the Harmon's store. The State has stretched the plain 
meaning of the statement. Barbara Harris's statement did not 
12 
create an articulable suspicion justifying the stop of the motor 
vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Gibbons, Vasilacopulos, and Valencia mandate strict compli-
ance with Rule 11 on the record when a guilty plea is entered. The 
Rule 11 violations in this case mandate that the matter be remanded 
to the trial court with instructions that the Motion to Withdraw 
the Guilty Plea be granted. The ineffective assistance of counsel 
issue should be reserved for future consideration if necessary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 1990. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and four correct copies 
of the foregoing, first class postage prepaid, on this day 
of April, 1990 to: 
Sandra L. Sjogren 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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APPENDIX 1 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 11 
AL.R. — Antagonistic defenses as ground Key Numbers. — Indictment and Informa-
fcr«parate trials of codefendants in criminal tion «=» 124 to 131 
OR, 82 A L.R 3d 245 
Sole 10. Arraignment. 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the records from the 
magistrate following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned 
•ithe district court. Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall 
consist of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or s tat ing to 
Urn the substance of the charge and call ing on him to plead thereto. He shall 
le given a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon to 
plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional t ime in which to 
(lead or otherwise respond, a reasonable t ime may b s granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any proceeding pro-
lided for by statute or these rules prior to arraignment shall be specifically 
ad expressly objected to before a plea of gui l ty is entered or the same is 
waived. 
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on h is own recognizance, 
prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or trial 
then required to do so, a warrant of arrest may issue and bail may be for-
feited. 
f77-35-10, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.) 
Cro88-References. — Harmless error. Rights of accused, Utah Const, Art I, Sees 7 
177-35-30. to 13. * 77-1-6 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Additional time to plead. len, it was equivalent of a new information re-
Where original information did not state quiring at raignment of defendant and his plea 
fikc offense and was amended so as to state thereto, and where defendant was not given 
pdbhcoffense for first time, as amending mfor- time to plead tor such information, court com-
•rion in larceny prosecution so as to allege mitted reversible error State v Jensen, 83 
•aerehip of property alleged to have been sto- Utah 452, 30 P 2d 203 (1934) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am Jur 2d Criminal Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •=» 261(1), 
Uv {§ 433 to 438 263, 264 
OJ.S. — 22 C J S Criminal Law <>*> 404, 
•7, 411. 
Sale 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court, 
ad shall not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable t ime to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant re-
uses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
inter a plea of not guilty 
349 
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise the defendant, or his 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shall 
not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has know-
ingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reason-
able doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be ap-
proved by the court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommen-
dation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agree-
ment being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agree-
ment has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation 
that other charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative agreement and the 
reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will 
approve the proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that final 
disposition should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, he 
shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm 
or withdraw his plea. 
(77-35-11, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 49, § 6.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment, in Subdivision (b), added "not guilty by 
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill" to 
the first sentence and added the second sen-
tence. 
Crofts-References. — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements. 
Rule 410, U.R.E. 
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245 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-35-11 
may commit him to jail until he complies or is 
otherwise legally discharged. 
(c) If the witness does provide bond when re-
quired, he may be examined and cross-examined 
before the magistrate in the presence of the de-
fendant and his testimony shall be recorded. He 
shall then be discharged. 
(d) If the witness is unavailable or fails to ap-
pear at any subsequent hearing or trial when 
ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be 
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal 
testimony of the witness. lass 
77-35-8. Rule 8 — Appointment of counsel. 
A defendant charged with a public offense, other 
than an infraction, who is indigent and unable to ob-
tain counsel has the right to court-appointed counsel 
if he faces a substantial probability of deprivation of 
liberty, or the right to present himself. iws 
77-35-9. Rule 9 — Joinder of offenses and 
of defendants. 
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the 
same indictment or information in a separate count 
for each offense if the offenses charged arise out of a 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. A 
felony offense and a misdemeanor offense may be 
charged in the same indictment or information if: 
(1) They arise out of a criminal episode; and 
(2) The defendant is afforded a preliminary 
hearing with respect to the misdemeanor along 
with the felony offense. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if they are alleged to 
have participated in the same act or conduct or in the 
same criminal episode. 
Such defendants may be charged in one or more 
counts together or separately and ail of the defen-
dants need not be charged in each count. 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged 
with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the 
court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise, orders 
separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or 
informations or both to be tried together if the of-
fenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one, 
could have been joined in a single indictment or infor-
mation. The procedure shall be the same as if the 
prosecution were under such single indictment or in-
formation. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution 
is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in 
an indictment or information, or by a joinder for trial 
together, the court shall order an election of separate 
trials of separate counts, or grant a severance of de-
fendants, or provide such other relief as justice re-
quires. 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or de-
fendants is waived if the motion is not made at least 
five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defen-
dant for severance, the court may order the prosecu-
tor to disclose any statements made by the defen-
dants which he intends to introduce in evidence at 
the trial. 1980 
77-35-10. Rule 10 —- Arraignment 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon re-
ceipt of the records from the magistrate following a 
bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned 
in the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted 
plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indict-
ment or information before he is called upon to plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests ad-
ditional time in which to plead or otherwise respond, 
a reasonable time may be granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence 
of any proceeding provided for by statute or these 
rules prior to arraignment shall be specifically and 
expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered 
or the same is waived. 
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on 
his own recognizance, prior to arraignment and 
thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or trial 
when required to do so, a warrant of arrest may issue 
and bail may be forfeited. i960 
77-35-11. Rule 11 — Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infrac-
tion, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, un-
less the defendant waives counsel in open court, and 
shall not be required to plead until he has had a rea-
sonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no 
contest, not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty and 
mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alterna-
tive not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a 
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corpora-
tion fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the 
consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, 
the case shall forthwith be set for trial. Defendants 
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise 
the defendant, or his counsel, of the requirements for 
making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea until 
the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by 
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury 
trial and to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by en-
tering the plea he waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is enter-
ing the plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed 
upon him for each offense to which a plea is en-
tered, including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a 
prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if 
so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or 
the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be ap-
proved by the court. If recommendations as to sen-
*An,.A OTO aUnwcxA hv the murt. the court shall advise 
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(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discus-
sions prior to any agreement being made by the pros-
ecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement 
has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea 
in the expectation tha t other charges will be dropped 
or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the parties, 
may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative 
agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the 
t ime for tender of the plea The judge may then indi-
cate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether he will approve the proposed disposition 
Thereafter, if the judge decides that final disposition 
should not be handled in conformity with the plea 
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw 
his plea 1963 
77-35-12. Ru le 12 — Mot ions . 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be 
by motion A motion other than one made during a 
trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court 
otherwise permits It shall state with particularity 
the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth 
the relief sought It may be supported by affidavit or 
by evidence 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including re-
quest for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, 
which is capable of determination without the trial of 
the general issue may be raised prior to trial by writ-
ten motion The following shall be raised at least five 
days prior to the trial 
(1) Defenses and objections based on defects in 
the indictment or information other than that it 
fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge 
an offense, which objection shall be noticed by 
the court at any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding, 
(2) Motions concerning the admissibility of ev-
idence, 
(3) Requests for discovery where allowed, 
(4) Requests for severance of charges or defen-
dants under Rule 9, or 
(5) Motions to dismiss on the ground of double 
jeopardy 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined 
before trial unless the court for good cause orders that 
the ruling be deferred for later determination Where 
factual issues are involved in determining a motion, 
the court shall state its findings on the record 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise de-
fenses or objections or to make requests which must 
be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court 
shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for 
cause shown may grant relief from such waiver 
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record 
shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on 
motions, including such findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law as are made orally 
(0 If the court grants a motion based on a defect in 
the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment 
or information, it may also order that bail be contin-
ued for a reasonable and specified time pending the 
filing of a new indictment or information Nothing in 
this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law 
relating to a statute of limitations 
(g) (1) In any motion concerning the admissibility 
of evidence or the suppression of evidence pursu 
good faith The court shall set forth its reasons 
for such finding 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in all 
cases be deemed substantial if one or more of the 
following is established by the defendant or ap-
plicant by a preponderance of the evidence 
d) The violation was grossly negligent, 
willful, malicious, shocking to the conscience 
of the court or was a result of the practice of 
the law enforcement agency pursuant to a 
general order of that agency, 
(n) The violation was intended only to ha-
rass without legitimate law enforcement 
purposes 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was 
acting in good faith under this section, the court 
shall consider, in addition to any other relevant 
factors, some or all of the following 
d) The extent of deviation from legal 
search and seizure standards, 
(n) The extent to which exclusion will 
tend to deter future violations of search and 
seizure standards, 
(in) Whether or not the officer was pro-
ceeding by way of a search warrant, arrest 
warrant, or relying on previous specific di-
rections of a magistrate or prosecutor, or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was in-
vaded 
(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes 
tha t the search or seizure was unlawful and sub-
stantial by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
peace officer or governmental agency must then, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the 
good faith actions of the peace officer 1982 
77-35-13. Rule 13 — Pre-trial conference. 
(a) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a 
pre-tnal conference, with trial counsel present, to 
consider such matters as will promote a fair and expe-
ditious trial The accused shall be present unless he 
waives his nght to appear 
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pre-trial 
order shall set out the matters ruled upon Any stipu-
lations made shall be signed by counsel, approved by 
the court and filed, and shall be 'binding upon the 
parties at trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction pro-
ceedings unless set aside or modified by the court 
1980 
77-35-14. Rule 14 — Subpoena. 
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a wit-
ness or interpreter before a court magistrate or 
grand jury, in connection with a criminal investiga 
tion or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate 
with whom an information is filed, the county attor-
ney on his own initiative or upon the direction of the 
grand jury, or the court in which an information or 
indictment is to be tned The clerk of the court in 
which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the 
defendant, without charge as manv signed sub-
poenas as the defendant may require 
fb) A subpoena may command the person to whom 
it is directed to appear and testify or to produce in 
court or to allow inspection of records papers or other 
objects The court ma> quash or modify the subpoena 
